By Iliuza Mukhamedianova
Introduction
In recent years, there has been increasing discussion about the rise of digital authoritarianism worldwide. States learn from one another and implement new elements for surveillance, censorship, propaganda, and the suppression of dissent.
Elements of digital authoritarianism are also widely used in Russia, as noted by many researchers and organizations. Deibert et al. (2010) argue that Russian authorities have employed an evolving system of "Information controls" - defined as techniques, practices, and regulations that circumscribe the types of information technology, media channels, and electronic communications available to citizens.
However, most research on digital authoritarianism in Russia focuses on the federal level, presenting a broader picture without capturing regional specificities, which can be crucial for understanding processes in contemporary Russia. In general, digital authoritarianism in Russia is well-established, but some regional cases are fascinating. For example, in late 2024, access to foreign services was blocked for 24 hours in Dagestan.(1)
The importance of highlighting regional events is also evident from the example of other countries. Some elements of digital authoritarianism are not applied universally. For instance, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has long been known as the cradle of digital authoritarianism in China.(2)
These observations prompt us to ask the following question: To what extent do the methods of digital authoritarianism employed by regional authorities mirror or diverge from federal-level strategies of online control and dissent suppression in Russia? The answer to this question will allow us to see how practices of digital authoritarianism are transmitted, adapted, or even originate at the regional level.
For this analysis, we will examine the Baymak events, which represent a unique case, happening far from the federal center, and which encountered local resistance. These protests are considered as possibly as the largest in Russia since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.(3) Furthermore, the subsequent legal proceedings against those involved have reportedly become one of the largest political cases in Russia's recent history.(4)
Methodology, Data and Reflexive Note on Positionality
For the analysis of digital authoritarianism in the Baymak case, we will use public media reports as well as sociological interviews with 16 protest participants, collected between February and September 2024.
As a scholar, originally from the Baymak district, the case of the Baymak protests resonated not only on an academic but also a personal level. This connection raises awareness of potential bias, including the emotional proximity to protest narratives and a critical stance toward state practices. However, it also enhances the ethical obligation to represent local voices with analytical rigor. Access to interviews and local sources was possible due to a level of trust and familiarity, which also demanded a heightened level of responsibility in data interpretation and protection of participant identity.
What Happened in Baymak?
In January 2024, three major protests took place in Bashkortostan in support of eco-activist Fail Alsynov, who was convicted under charges of "extremism." His offense was the use of the Bashkir term "qara halyq" (ҡара халыҡ) in a public speech, which was interpreted as ‘derogatory towards people from the Caucasus and Central Asia, translated as "dark-skinned" or "rabble"’. Notably, the report against him was personally filed by Radiy Khabirov, the Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan.
Fail Alsynov is one of the founders of the Bashkir national movement “Bashkort”, which was declared extremist by authorities in 2020. He is also well-known as an organizer of the 2020 protests defending the sacred Kushtau Mountain, which took place in August of that year. Furthermore, Alsynov openly criticized Russia's invasion of Ukraine, labeling it a “genocide of the Bashkir people”.(5) This is happening due to the following crucial fact: the Republic of Bashkortostan consistently ranked first in Russia in terms of the number of confirmed casualties in the war with Ukraine.(6)
On January 15, in the town of Baymak (population: 17,000), up to 5,000 people gathered outside the courthouse, where a closed hearing was scheduled to deliver Alsynov’s sentence. The hearing was postponed to January 17, but on January 16, six Bashkir activists, considered the protest organizers, were arrested. That same day, Alsynov was added to the federal list of "organizations and individuals involved in extremist or terrorist activities."
Across the republic, internet disruptions were reported, and the main activist Telegram channel "Kushtau-Bairam" was blocked. Despite these measures, on January 17, an estimated 10,000 people gathered outside the courthouse. Security forces from all districts of Bashkortostan and some neighbouring regions of Russia were deployed to the area. Alsynov was sentenced to four years in prison, a verdict that the gathered crowd considered excessively harsh. Some demonstrators, expressing their anger, began throwing snow and pieces of firewood at the security forces. In response, the authorities used tear gas and stun grenades to disperse the crowd, ultimately breaking up the protest.
On the same day, a popular Bashkir rapper, Altynai Valitov, released an emotional video calling for a peaceful demonstration on January 19 at the Salavat Yulaev monument in Ufa to protest government abuses. This spontaneous peaceful protest, which drew between 500 and 2,000 participants according to various reports, was also violently suppressed.
In the aftermath, it is known that more than 80 individuals are defendants in the criminal proceedings related to the 'Baymak case'.(7) Within six months following the protests, over 550 people faced administrative charges, resulting in arrests, compulsory labor, or fines.(8) One detainee, Rifat Dautov, died during transportation to Ufa, while another, Minniyar Baiguskarov, reportedly died by suicide as a result of pressure from security forces during interrogation.(9)
Digital Authoritarianism in the Case
After describing Baymak events, we now turn to an analysis of these events through the lens of digital authoritarianism. To directly address the central research question, we will begin by examining the elements of the well-documented federal toolkit of digital authoritarianism as they were applied in Bashkortostan. Then, we will look at the unique regional examples and peculiarities.
The Federal Toolkit of Digital Authoritarianism: Application in the Baymak Case
Internet Shutdowns in the Republic of Bashkortostan
Beginning on January 16th, significant internet service disruptions were reported across the
Republic of Bashkortostan.(10) Eyewitness accounts indicated difficulties, at a minimum, in accessing the WhatsApp messaging service. An employee of a telecommunications company informed Forbes that Roskomnadzor had been blocking WhatsApp in Bashkortostan for three days using 'technical means for countering threats' (TSPU) installed on operator networks.(11)
Furthermore, reports indicated a complete internet blackout in the town of Baymak, where even VPN services were ineffective in bypassing the restrictions. It is also known that Telegram services were inoperative in the Ufa area from January 18th; notably, the third major protest was scheduled to occur in Ufa the following day.(12). Internet shutdowns as at regional level as at federal level is a wide-practices instrument
Surveillance and Identification of Protesters
Many detainees were identified through mobile phone billing data, a fact corroborated by the protesters themselves during interviews. For instance, respondent Abdulkhak noted a significant difference compared to previous protests: "This wasn't the case at Kushtau, but here it is – they used billing data to track phones; whose SIM card was in this area, they identified them by phone – even those guys who were wearing masks". This indicates that individuals were located based on their SIM card signals within the protest vicinity.(13)
The use of surveillance cameras for participant identification was also reported. Vehicle license plates were checked, and court proceedings even referenced data showing the exact duration participants spent at the protest site.(14) As respondent Adelya testified, referring to the surveillance system: "She sees everything, the judge had my schedule. What time I arrived – I arrived at 10 o'clock, and I left at 5 o'clock". Additionally, law enforcement footage was utilized to locate protesters, and it is probable that images shared on social media by journalists and activists covering the events were also used for identification purposes.
The use of mobile billing data and extensive CCTV networks for protester identification reflects a broader federal push towards technologically-enhanced surveillance, as documented by media and digital rights organisations.
Blocking information sources
On January 16, the Telegram channel "Kushtau Bairam," widely considered a primary source for information on the Baymak events, was blocked. Simultaneously, other activist Telegram channels ceased to operate, including "Tot samyi iz Bashkort" (The One from Bashkort), belonging to Alsynov's associate Ruslan Gabbasov, among others.. . Notably, the blocking also affected the Telegram channel of the media outlet RusNews, which had been actively covering the protests. According to the BBC, Telegram denied involvement, suggesting the disruptions might be linked to the actions of local telecom operators.(15). Subsequently, a newly created "Kushtau Bairam" Telegram channel was also blocked, along with others.
Within the Russian Federation, blocking also targeted the "Irandyksky Sabantuy" public page on the social network "VKontakte," where the Baymak protests were being discussed. The blocking was based on Demand No. 27-31-2023/Treb11-24 from the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, dated January 13, 2024.(16)
This trend of suppression has continued. For instance, the group “Baimak. Aresty. Khronika sobytiy” (Baymak. Arrests. Chronicle of Events), dedicated to the stories of detained participants in the Baymak events, was blocked on March 26, 2025, at the request of Roskomnadzor (No. 1125776-NV). The group had been active since January 15, 2024, and included posts, among other things, calling for appeals to Volodin and Putin for amnesty.(17)
Such targeted blocking of independent media and activist channels, often initiated by Roskomnadzor or the Prosecutor General's Office, is a standard federal procedure for controlling the information narrative.
Labelling as “Extremists” and “Terrorists”
On January 16, the day after the first major protest in Baymak, Fail Alsynov was added to Rosfinmonitoring's federal "List of organizations and individuals regarding whom there is information about their involvement in extremist activities or terrorism". The application of “anti-extremist” legislation to silence dissent and target activists is a consistently used tool at the federal level in Russia. Additionally, there is popular labeling as a “foreign agent” or “undesirable organization”.
Propaganda campaign
“Euro-Maidan” Narratives
Authorities utilized narratives of an "Ukrainian trace," a "new Maidan," and the "influence of Western media" to discredit the protesters. For example, State Duma deputy Dinar Gilmutdinov wrote that "such attempts were initiated not without the participation of elements related to the special services of foreign states and operating from the territory of Ukraine and the Baltic states".(18)
On January 22, the Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Radiy Khabirov, published a video on Telegram alleging that the protesters' connection to "the West" was maintained through Ruslan Gabbasov, head of the Bashkir National Movement Committee Abroad.(19)
Meanwhile, representatives of the Committee denied any involvement in the protests.(20)
Creation of an “Enemy” and Marginalization of Public Opinion Leaders
The authorities also actively cultivated the idea of an "enemy" of the Bashkir people. The primary enemy figure portrayed was not so much "the West" but rather participants of the national organization "Bashkort," which was shut down in 2020 after being declared "extremist."
Particular attention was also paid to public opinion leaders. For instance, Altynai Valitov, a rapper who had called for participation in the protests, was forced to leave the country due to pressure from the authorities. We are also aware of tax audits targeting bloggers who covered the events, though they declined to discuss this with us.
Both of these propaganda tactics are most clearly evident in the film "Anatomy of Bashkir Nationalism: The Baymak Tragedy" (Anatomiya bashkirskogo natsionalizma. Baimakskaya tragediya)(21), broadcast on the region's main TV channel, BST, reportedly to mark the anniversary of the protests. Approximately one-third of the film is dedicated to the marginalization of the "Bashkort" organization, and it also singles out bloggers who covered the events on their platforms. Federal authorities also like to use the narrative of the “Ukraine-influence” and create the West as the enemy in many cases.
To sum up, the toolkit – including internet shutdowns, sources blocking, extensive surveillance, labelling as “terrorists” or “extremists” and the propaganda – is characteristic of the broader Russian state's approach to dissent suppression.(22)
Whether these actions were direct federal mandates, regional initiatives mirroring federal priorities, or a combination thereof, the outcome was an effort to control the information space and suppress the protests, demonstrating the pervasive nature of these control mechanisms across different levels of authority.
Regional Specificities and Adaptations in Suppressing Dissent
While many tactics employed in Baymak mirrored federal strategies, several distinct regional characteristics and adaptations in the methods of surveillance and dissent suppression were also evident.
Leveraging Local Networks and Personnel for Surveillance
A notable regional feature was the authorities' reliance on local personnel and networks for identifying protesters from video footage. Bashkortostan, with its significant rural areas, possesses a specific social dynamic where community members often have close personal acquaintance.
For instance, one respondent, Ainur, a local police officer, stated: "We were sent because the locals know us; anyway, it's about having a connection with the people". He explained his presence at the protests as follows: "We stood there, calmed people down, explained the court [proceedings]. Why we are standing here. And that's all". His own brother was 'on the other side,' among the protesters, and even suffered injuries from tear gas and stun grenades. It should be noted, however, that to disperse the protesters, security forces were brought in from neighboring districts and even other regions. This extensive use of local officers to identify individuals from protest footage highlights a fusion of digital evidence (video or photos) with offline, community-based knowledge for surveillance purposes.
Co-opting and Pressuring Local Opinion Leaders
Following the Baymak protests, on January 30, the Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Radiy Khabirov, convened a meeting with approximately 20 bloggers. According to Khabirov, they discussed “how they will live and how they will develop Bashkortostan”.(23) He also proposed making such meetings regular.(24)
This initiative can be interpreted as an attempt to co-opt local influencers and control the regional information space, adapting federal tactics of working with opinion leaders to the local context.
Digital Infrastructure Gaps for Offline Control
Bashkortostan's digital infrastructure is characterized by network coverage primarily in and around populated areas. On some routes, such as the Ufa-Baymak highway, mobile network connectivity is virtually non-existent outside of towns and villages. Authorities seemingly exploited this fact when a road sign indicating the turn towards Baymak was reportedly defaced by being painted over. In an area with poor mobile reception, a driver without a GPS-enabled navigator could easily become lost, hindering their ability to reach the protest location. This example shows how offline control methods can be designed to take advantage of existing limitations in digital infrastructure.
Image 1. The sign in the Ufa-Baymak highway.
The Ukraine War as a Factor in Regional Information Battles
A particularly interesting development involved participants in Russia's "Special Military Operation" (SVO)(25) in Ukraine. Initially, some service members recorded and circulated videos expressing support for the Baymak protesters.(26)
In response to this, on January 17, the pro-government Telegram channel “Fight Against Fakes” (Borba s Feikami) published a counter-video featuring soldiers from the Bashkir battalion named after Minigali Shaimuratov, part of the Russian Armed Forces. These soldiers urged residents of the republic to “condemn Fail Alsynov and express their contempt for him”.(27) Through this case we can see how the ongoing war, which physically exists far from the local protests, can influence in the regions.
Region-Specific Propaganda: Pan-Turkism Narratives
The titular nation of Bashkortostan, the Bashkirs, are a Turkic Indigenous group. Alongside accusations of extremism and Western influence, narratives invoking Pan-Turkism were also prominently used in relation to the Baymak protests. For instance, in the previously mentioned BST channel film, “Anatomy of Bashkir Nationalism: The Baymak Tragedy”, the host Timur Valitov asserted that the roots of Bashkir nationalism are embedded in the influence of pro-Turkish organizations. Other sources have circulated similar claims.(28)
It is a unique case of propagandistic narratives that can be used only in Turkic-language regions with an Islamic background.
Thus, the Baymak case reveals a complex interplay of online and offline suppression tactics. It demonstrates how local specificities, such as close-knit rural communities and particular ethno cultural narratives, are instrumentalized for surveillance and propaganda. Furthermore, unique regional circumstances, including digital infrastructure limitations and the symbolic weight of local figures involved in the Ukraine war, shaped both the methods of control and the dynamics of the information landscape. Especially interesting fact, that the regional specificity is also used by the government for propaganda purposes, as a Pan-Turkic narrative.
Conclusion
The response to the Baymak protests underscores a complex interplay between federal and regional levels of governance in the application of digital authoritarianism. While identifying the precise initiator of each action can be challenging, regional authorities in Bashkortostan were clearly instrumental in deploying a toolkit largely derived from federal strategies.
Concurrently, their efforts to suppress dissent and control the information space were marked by significant local adaptations and unique regional tactics. It was found that federal strategies such as internet shutdowns, mass surveillance, and blocking of information resources were also actively used in Baymak. However, along with this, unique regional features were also revealed: reliance on local informal networks to identify protesters, the use of specific ethnic and cultural narratives in propaganda, and the exploitation of the features of local digital infrastructure for offline control.
This study highlights the importance of studying the regional dimension of digital authoritarianism, demonstrating that control strategies are not monolithic and can be significantly transformed on the ground. Understanding these regional adaptations is critical for assessing the overall sustainability and effectiveness of authoritarian practices, as well as for developing strategies to counter them.
Further research could focus on comparative analysis of the application of digital authoritarianism in different regions of Russia to identify more general patterns of regional adaptation. It would also be important to study in more depth how these practices are perceived by the populations of the regions themselves.
Ultimately, the Baymak case serves as a vivid reminder that even in a centralized authoritarian regime, regional context continues to play a significant role, shaping unique trajectories of both state control and public resistance.
References
Deibert, R., Palfrey, J., Rohozinski, R., & Zittrain, J. (2010). Access controlled: The shaping of power, rights, and rule in cyberspace (p. 634). The MIT Press.
1 Kavkaz.Realii. “Dagestan Restricts Access to Foreign Internet Segment for 24 Hours.” Kavkaz.Realii, December 6, 2024. https://www.kavkazr.com/a/v-dagestane-na-sutki-ogranichili-dostup-k-zarubezhnomu-segmentu-interneta/33229481.html.
2 Reyhan Topal, “A Techno-Docility Approach to the Repression and Surveillance of Uyghurs,” Asian Survey 64, no. 1 (November 2023): 143–167, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.2079647.
3 Darya Kucherenko, “Thousands of People Took to the Streets in the Largest Protest in Russia Since the Start of the War,” Verstka, January 17, 2024,https://verstka.media/tisyachi-lydey-vishli-na-samiy-massoviy-protest-v-rossii-s-nachala-voini.
4 Yulia Selikhova,“The Largest Political Case Since the USSR: Nearly 100 People Accused of Mass Riots in Bashkortostan,” Holod, June 3, 2024, https://holod.media/2024/06/03/samoe-krupnoe-politicheskoe-delo-so-vremen-sssr/.
5 Pavel Kuznetsov, “Personal Enemy of the Head of Bashkortostan: Who Is Fail Alsynov, Sentenced to Four Years in Prison Following the Governor’s Complaint,” Novaya Gazeta Europe, January 17, 2024, https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/01/17/lichnyi-vrag-glavy-bashkirii.
6 BBC Russian,“Leadership of Bashkortostan: What Is Known About Russia’s Losses in Ukraine by Mid-December,” December 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c93g42d2ky9o.
7 OVD-Info, Dataset of Criminal Cases Related to the Baymak Protests, accessed May 28, 2025, https://airtable.com/appM0RUv3AZgjWJXX/shrRhn9eR0tyzfgkI/tbldEW4S6zyMPb8MZ viewControls=on.8 OVD-Info, Dataset of Administrative Cases Related to the Baymak Protests, accessed May 28, 2025, https://airtable.com/appVmVbl8ZZjYEQsw/shridWCfhd1htiKF8/tbllQYRxPC8ucfThp?viewControls=on.
9 Memorial, “Bayguskarov, Minniyar Bulatovich,” Support for Political Prisoners, accessed May 28, 2025, https://memopzk.org/figurant/bajguskarov-minniyar-bulatovich/.
10 GTRK Bashkortostan,“Residents of Bashkortostan Report Massive Disruptions in WhatsApp Messenger,” GTRK Bashkortostan, January 17, 2024, https://gtrk.tv/novosti/337057-zhiteli-bashkirii-soobshchayut-massovyh-sboyah-rabote-messendzhera-whatsapp.
11 Anastasia Korochkina and Anastasia Gavrilyuk, “Bashkortostan Authorities Responded to Complaints about Telegram and WhatsApp Disruptions,” Forbes Russia, January 19, 2024, https://www.forbes.ru/society/504629-vlasti-baskortostana-otvetili-na-zaloby-na-ogranicenie-raboty-telegram-i-whatsapp.
12 Roskomsvoboda,“Protests in Bashkortostan Occurred Amid Shutdown and Blocking of Telegram Channels,” Roskomsvoboda, January 17, 2024, https://roskomsvoboda.org/ru/post/shutdown-v-baymake/.
13 Current Time, “'Armed Resistance' from Snow and Sticks: How 33 Investigators Are Finding New Defendants in the Baymak Protest Case,” Current Time, March 22, 2024,https://www.currenttime.tv/a/delo-o-protestah-v-baymake/32872035.html.
14 Ibid.
15 BBC Russian, Telegram post, January 17, 2024, https://t.me/bbcrussian/59416.16 Roskomsvoboda, “Protests in Bashkortostan Occurred Amid Shutdown and Blocking of Telegram Channels,” Roskomsvoboda, January 17, 2024, https://roskomsvoboda.org/ru/post/shutdown-v-baymake/.
17 Govorit NeMoskva, Telegram post, January 17, 2024, https://t.me/GovoritNeMoskva/42699.
18 Ilshat Gilmutdinov, Telegram post, January 17, 2024, https://t.me/dgilmutdinov/5737.19 Radiy Khabirov, Telegram post, January 17, 2024, https://t.me/radiyhabirov/6422.
20 Bashkir National Movement Abroad, “Statement of the Bashkir National Movement Abroad,” Anti-Imperial Block of Nations, January 20, 2024, https://abn.org.ua/en/documents/statement-of-the-bashkir-national-movement-abroad/.
21 Timur Valitov, Anatomy of Bashkir Nationalism: The Baymak Tragedy, YouTube video, posted January 17, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQ8PmBWaWRU.22 At least, all of them, excluding propaganda, mentioned in the IPHR, 2023.
23 Radiy Khabirov, Telegram post, January 30, 2024, https://t.me/radiyhabirov/6492.24 Anastasia Drugova, “Head of Bashkortostan Proposed Making Meetings with Bloggers Regular,” Bashinform,January 30, 2024, https://www.bashinform.ru/news/social/2024-01-30/glava-bashkirii-predlozhil-sdelat-vstrechi-s-blogerami-regulyarnymi-3623509.
25 SVO (Special Military Operation) — the official designation used by the Russian government for its invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022
26 Alsynov Bashkort, Telegram post, January 14, 2024, https://t.me/AlsynovBashkort/154.
27 Warfakes, Telegram post, January 17, 2024, https://t.me/warfakes/19890
28 Rybar.“Anniversary of the Baymak Riots: How Proponents of Pan-Turkism Attempted to Orchestrate a Provocation in Russia.” Rybar, January 17, 2025.https://rybar.ru/godovshhina-bajmakskih-besporyadkov-kak-storonniki-idej-pantyurkizma-pytalis-ustroit-provokacziyu-v-rf/.
Olga Solovyeva, PhD | Good tech & Digital safety strategist | London, UK
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